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Abstract 
Government bureaucracy efficiency, and its attending cost for society, is one of the gravest issues currently facing 
Ukraine. The low efficiency of Ukrainian government bureaucracy is caused by a merger of bureaucracy, political 
power, and large, manipulating business interests. As a result, Ukraine faces a significantly depressed economy, a high 
level of corruption, low property rights protection, and a pervasive lack of trust in the government in general. In order to 
understand the true costs and benefits of government bureaucracy for the Ukrainian society, a methodology of 
calculating bureaucracy specifically for Ukraine was developed. Previously unused indicators were added to provide 
greater accuracy. The inefficiency of Ukrainian government bureaucracy was determined categorically. Paths to the 
improvement of Ukrainian government bureaucracy efficiency were suggested. 
Keywords: bureaucracy, efficiency, costs, benefit, corruption, marginal costs 
1. Introducation 
The ideological transformation of Ukrainian society from administration-by-fiat to a democratic system demanded 
intensive institutional reforms be made. Often this situation becomes the basis for the creation of new government 
organizations in addition to those already in existence. This in turn raises the costs of maintaining government 
bureaucracy, increasing the fiscal burden on society.  However, the effect of such an increase in the cost of maintaining 
that larger bureaucracy is not always accompanied by benefits hoped for by the society. 
One of the peculiarities of the modern Ukrainian government bureaucracy development was inherited from the Soviet 
period. Government bureaucracy then was under the control of politicians, and its main role was to implement 
Communist Party ideology. Unlike other countries within the Socialist camp, modern Ukrainian bureaucracy inherited 
traits not only from the bureaucracy of the socialistic period, but also from the bureaucracy of Imperial Russia, still 
being manifested in Ukraine even after a number of attempts to carry out democratic transformations. Another feature 
of the Ukrainian bureaucracy began to take shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In that time 
Ukraine experienced an initial accumulation of capital stage, which took place without a proper legal basis. As a result, 
state ownership fell into the hands of a limited circle of people who then privatized state assets, and significantly, 
political power. 
The desire for great social and political change then grew into the Orange Revolution in 2004, but the expectations of 
society were subsequently left unfulfilled. The changes that were needed in the area of government bureaucracy simply 
did not occur. Instead, a new stage of property redistribution and entrenchment of oligarchic clans and power took place. 
Ever since then, the leaders of these groups directly or indirectly have had unlimited access to the economic resources 
of the state, ensuring a constant growth of wealth, stashing money abroad through offshore accounts, which contributed 
nothing to the development of Ukraine's economy and left its competitiveness in the modern world floundering. The 
loss of confidence in the leaders of the Orange Revolution became the basis of Viktor Yanukovych coming to power, 
resulting in a ruling party vertical and strict distribution of government posts to those who belonged to that party. The 
so-called Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014 had as its goal the destruction of this system. However, the first 
government of A.Yatsenyuk showed that the ruling political class would continue to support the traditional “policy – 
bureaucracy – big business” modus operandi. Again, access to key government positions was closed to those who do 
not belong to nor support this system. The reality in Ukraine continues to show past patterns of behavior with an 
extensive co-mingling of bureaucracy and business, maintaining the ineffectiveness of governance, and especially, 
active cooperation with the political elite, often basing major government decisions on the selfish vested interests of that 
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elite. The system of “policy – bureaucracy – big business" turns out to not only be seemingly impossible to replace or 
modify, but extremely expensive and inefficient in its service to the citizens of Ukraine. Despite all the lip service paid 
to allegiance to western democratic values and desires to join the European Union, this merger of political power, 
government, and big business does not contribute in any way to Ukraine's social and economic development, but rather, 
is denying the chance for future generations of Ukraine to live in a truly democratic country. Regarding the cost of 
government bureaucracy to the Ukrainian nation, the direct costs of taxpayer funds for its upkeep is not the only 
ramification, but also the losses occurring indirectly as a result of ineffective government bureaucracy. This is why the 
main object of the article to show how much Ukrainian society looses because of unefficient government bureaucracy.  
2. Literature Review 
A complete study of bureaucracy was conducted by the German sociologist, M. Weber. He is one of the few who spoke 
of bureaucracy with kind words, and even idealized it. The most important benefit of the bureaucracy, he thought, was 
governance competence based on knowledge. M. Weber considered the effective activities of a government 
administrative apparatus to be a necessary condition for the rational organization of the social and economic reality in 
general (Weber, 1922). His publications became the starting point for the development of independent concepts of 
bureaucracy. Publications of recent years about theories of bureaucracy development are different, but mainly are within 
a single concept. Part of this publication is devoted to the historical aspect of the development of bureaucracy, its 
relationship with the formation of modern models of societal functioning (F. Monnier & G. Thuillier, 2010, 
D. Ungureanu, 2012). The turning of the 20th to the 21st century in Ukraine was marked by an aggravation of the 
problems caused by government bureaucracy inefficiency. This caused a growth of interest in institutional approaches, 
where economists have paid heightened attention to the principles of good governance, as reflected in the publications S. 
Knack and P. Keefer (1994), D. Rodrick (1999), D. Kaufmann (2004) etc. 
A large number of Ukrainian publications in recent years have been devoted to the political aspect of bureaucratic 
functions and its role in social and political life (O. Tsapko, 2012, O. Batrymenko, 2009, М. Doroshko, 2008, V. Puhach, 
2006) etc. Part of this research is focused on the evaluation of bureaucracy effectiveness in the public sector from the 
point of view of public choice rationality; and to identify the causes of the bureaucratic crisis and its consequences for 
the nation. 
The problem of measuring the effectiveness of government bureaucracy began to be actively explored by scholars in the 
late 20th - early 21st centuries. Ideas of bureaucracy effectiveness being measured are based mainly on macroeconomic 
indicators of a nation's success in development (R. Hall & C. Jones, 1999, P. Evans & JE. Rauch, 1999, D. Dollar & A. 
Kraay, 2003). The development of common indicators of government bureaucracy effectiveness are presented in 
publications by D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay & P. Zoido-Lobaton, 1999, S. Knack, M. Kugler & N. Manning, 2005, 
АD Williams & A. Siddique, 2007. A number of reports of government bureaucracy efficiency evaluations, the impact on 
economic development, and the level of corruption in various countries were published by the International Monetary 
Fund. International comparisons of bureaucracy efficiency in terms of education, health, justice, and administration of 
taxes annually were published by the OECD. However, a unified government bureaucracy valuation of cost to society and 
effectiveness of government bureaucracy functions for individual countries has still not been developed. 
The purpose of this article is an analysis of Ukrainian government bureaucracy costs, an assessment of its effectiveness, 
and a cost-benefit analysis of government bureaucratic activity for the nation. 
3. Method 
Arriving at an accurate estimate of the costs of a functioning bureaucracy is a complex problem that is caused by the 
necessity of the use of quantitative and qualitative indicators, as well as a combination of cost and benefit indicators. On 
the basis of only an absolute amount of government bureaucracy financing and pace of growth it is not possible to draw 
conclusions about its cost to society. Situations where a growing number of officials and increasing expenditures will be 
accompanied by a corresponding growth of competitiveness of the national economy and increase in the general welfare of 
society are not excluded. According to Max Weber this effect is possible when an impersonal functioning bureaucracy is 
present, and which guarantees protection from arbitrary actions by a state. That is why government bureaucracy should 
have as its principle function to be an instrument for the good of the society it serves, and not turned into an autonomous 
force, usurping power for its own ends. Therefore, increases and decreases of government bureaucracy and the attending 
cost should be justified, that is matched by a corresponding beneficial effect for the society. Often such statements are 
taken too literally and have become a basis for reducing the cost of government bureaucracy, or number of officials, in 
order to have economic growth and an increase in the general welfare of a society. 
A peculiarity of government bureaucracy is that it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of its activity at any particular 
stage of society, but it is impossible to predict exactly how these figures would change depending on only quantitative 
changes (e.g, the number of officials or associated costs). These changes can be positive when society respects 
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government and is prepared to collaborate with it, as described in the articles of K. Murphy, M. Shleifer & R. Vishny 
(1993) and G. Richardson (2008). In cases of a negative attitude to power and disbelief that the arrival of a new 
government could improve life in a society, because of a long history of failure to substantiate election promises, the 
impact of changes in the number and cost of financing government bureaucracy becomes unpredictable. This situation 
was described in the publications of T. Rudolph (2009) and B. Caplan (2007). 
Therefore, an evaluation of bureaucracy effectiveness requires an assessment of the costs and benefits of bureaucracy 
activity. If more benefits are provided at a stable cost, the efficiency will be higher. When estimating the cost of 
government bureaucracy from a society’s point of view, it is important to bear in mind that the funds allocated to 
finance government bureaucracy are sourced from taxpayers. It is therefore natural that an increase in the cost of 
bureaucracy should be accompanied by a growth in social benefits, albeit with some time lag. The effects from reducing 
the cost of bureaucracy are more debatable. If this reduction is associated with a policy of deficit reduction, it must also 
consider the ultimate effect on a society. That is, the efficiency of bureaucracy to society should not be reduced because 
the tax burden will be the same or even increased. 
A difficulty in assessing bureaucracy effectiveness is caused by the lack of a common approach to defining the essence 
of the bureaucracy efficiency, and therefore the choice of indicators. The possibilities of using mathematical methods 
are also limited, because the sample data is small, and in Ukraine systematized information on government bureaucracy 
financing is only available from 2007. 
International organizations are developing methods for assessing the value and effectiveness of the bureaucracy and 
periodically publish the results. In 2006 the European Central Bank published working materials1 that became the basis 
for evaluating the effectiveness of government bureaucracy for new EU member states and countries with emerging 
economies. The basis of the methodology combined standard criteria (R. Musgrave’s criteria) and alternative indicators 
(Table. 1), on which the PSP index is calculated (Public sector performance). 
Table 1. Indicators of Government Bureaucracy Efficiency  
Alternative indicators Standard indicators
Corruption 
Administration 
Redistribution Gini Ratio  
Red tape 
Stability 
Inflation (recent 10 years)
Rule of law Stability in GDP growth (10 years) 
Shadow economy 
Economic development 
Unemployment (recent 10 
years) Quality of science Education 
Infant mortality Health care Real GDP growth in recent 10 years Remaining life expectancy 
Source: created by authors  
The use of this index is valid for analyses between countries, which goes beyond the scope of this article. However, 
some indicators can be used to assess efficiency of the bureaucracy for particular countries, including Ukraine. Based 
on previous research done in western countries and taking into account the specifics of Ukraine, methods of evaluating 
the effectiveness of the bureaucracy and its costs to society, the following can be seen: 
1. Assessment of the relationship between expenditures to finance government bureaucracy and economic growth. For 
this purpose, information about total GDP, expenditures to finance the government bureaucracy, the share of these 
expenditures in the general consolidated budget and GDP was used (Table. 2) 
2. Assessment of the relationship of government bureaucracy costs with indicators of economic development. To do this, 
information about the funding system of public administrations, civil servants and local government officials was 
obtained, and the share of these expenditures in the consolidated budget and GDP was used (Table. 2). The importance 
of analyzing these indicators is due to the declaration of the Ukrainian government to pursue a course of fiscal 
decentralization. The results of analysis reveal how government intentions correspond to reality. 
3. Maintenance cost analysis of all executive staff of ministries, both central and regional, and its relationship with 
economic growth (Table. 3). For this purpose, growth of GDP per capita and indicators of marginal costs were used. 
4. Analysis of Ukrainian government bureaucracy expenditures using state development indicators in international 
rankings (Tables 4-6). The analysis was based on information of the State Treasury Service of Ukraine (public 
administration expenditures), the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (GDP), National Agency of Ukraine on Civil 
Service (number of civil servants in state bodies and officials of local governments). All information is contained in the 
                                                        
1 Public Sector Efficiency Evidence for New EU Member States and Emerging Markets 1 by António Afonso 2, 3, 
Ludger Schuknecht 3 and Vito Tanzi. WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 5 8 1 / JANUARY 2006 
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public domain, with data available starting in 2007. 
5. Conclusions and acknowledgements. 
4. Results 
To start, an assessment of the overall situation of government bureaucracy funding and its effectiveness was given. The 
assessment is based on the indicators which are presented in Table 1 and the information which is given in the Table. 2. 
The amount of government bureaucracy funding (expenditures for public administration is the official name of the budget 
classification) tend to increase, but their share of expenditures and in GDP gradually decreases (Table. 2). The number of 
people involved in the work of the bureaucracy (civil servants and local government officials) for 2008-2009 and 
2012-2013 increased but from 2014 the number is steadily reduced. These uneven trends were caused by repeated changes 
of state policy. In 2014, a plan to reduce the number of officials, with corresponding reduction in funding, was announced. 
It should be noted that fluctuations in the size of the bureaucracy and its funding unevenly correspond with economic 
and welfare growth during this period. Thus, indicators such as Ginny rate, inflation, GDP growth, and 
unemployment did not meet the criteria of an effective bureaucracy. In particular, the Ginny ratio in 2007 was 27.01, 
in 2012 it was 24.74, in 2015 it was 24.01; these trends show a high level of income disparity. When comparing the 
dynamics of the Ukrainian Ginny ratio with those in developed countries, the situation does not seem too critical. 
However, for economies like the Ukrainian, in the context of evaluating the effectiveness of government bureaucracy 
funding, this is not the only important factor. It is necessary also to consider the level of poverty and the share in total 
income of the 10% richest and 10% poorest. In Ukraine, the 10% richest segment increased in 2015 and almost 
reached a 25% share in total income. 
The inflation rate in 2007-2009 annually exceeded 10%, and in 2014 and 2015, growth in the consumer price index was 
124.9% and 143.3% respectively. Over the past two years, the unemployment level (according to ILO methodology) 
and the average duration of unemployment has increased, and is growing. As shown in Table 2, there is a nominal GDP 
increase, but this increase is inflationary. GDP growth calculated in US dollar terms, shows a deep decline in 2009 of 
34.9%, further slowdown in 2012-2013, and falls in 2014 and 2015 by 28.1 and 31.3% respectively. 
Thus, the standard Musgrave’s indicators of bureaucracy performance indicate low efficiency in Ukraine. As the 
described situation is prolonged, its consequences are an increasingly negative attitude of society towards government 
bureaucracy. Most people no longer perceive the government as legitimate, but charging them taxes which are used for 
an inefficient government bureaucracy, perceived as an unjustified burden. This situation was described by B. Caplan 
(2007) and Е. Weede (1996). This often occurs when political parties have access to a redistribution of public resources 
because of the politicization of bureaucracy and its fusion with big business. 
Even though politicians over the past decade have been talking about the need to strengthen local government and 
activate fiscal decentralization, the share of local expenditures for financing local bureaucracy has grown slowly, the 
average growth rate over the period amounting to 2%. If we compare the ratio of civil servants and local government 
officials, the results do not conform to government guidelines. In 2007, the share of local government officials 
amounted to 27.16%, in 2012 - 26.31%, in 2015 - 23.72%. Instead, an increase of civil servants is continuing contrary 
to the process of fiscal decentralization. 
The management cost per unit in ministries, other central executive bodies, and in regional bodies increased (Table. 3). 
If a general trend of increased costs could be explained by an inflation factor, the increase in costs should be 
accompanied by an appropriate effect for society. However, during the study period, the management cost growth per 
unit was not accompanied by a marginal growth in GDP. During the study period, marginal GDP is less than marginal 
cost, except in 2009. 
In addition, there is a very weak correlation between the studied parameters, even considering the fact that calculations 
were made using a small sample (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Correlation between marginal GDP and marginal costs per a civil servant 
Source: calculated by authors 
The absence of a strong correlation between marginal costs of government bureaucracy and marginal GDP indicates that 
the activity of the bureaucracy in Ukraine is ineffective for the welfare of society. This partly explains the increase in 
the shadow economy, the reluctance to voluntarily pay taxes, and a growing distrust, not only in a particular government, 
but to government in general. Thus, the standard Musgrave’s indicators prove that Ukrainian government bureaucracy is 
inefficient, therefore the cost of its maintenance may be regarded by society as a burden. 
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Table 2. Sources of Ukrainian Government Bureaucracy Funding in 2007-2015 
Indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Expenditures on 
public 
administration, 
total mln UAH 
7442,68 10074,49 9557,93 10773,45 11418,13 12083,03 12794,78 12513,91 14252,6
State budget, 
mln UAH 2814,22 3809,82 3249,69 3550,21 3626,73 3854,12 4300,25 4331,89 4482,85
Share of state 
budget 
expenditures in 
total 
expenditures, % 
37,81 37,82 34,00 32,95 31,76 31,90 33,61 34,62 31,45 
Local budgets, 
mln UAH 4628,46 6264,69 6308,24 7223,24 7791,39 8228,9 8494,52 8182,55 9769,75
Share of local 
budgets 
expenditures in 
total 
expenditures, % 
62,19 62,18 66,00 67,05 68,24 68,10 66,39 65,39 68,55 
Total budget 
expenditures, 
mln UAH 
226054,3
7 
309203,7
3 
307399,3
5 
377842,8
4 
416853,5
8 
492434,6
6 
505843,8
1 
523125,
7 
679871,
4 
GDP, mln UAH 720731 948056 913345 1082569 1316600 1408889 1454931 1566728 1979458
Share of 
expenditures on 
public 
administration in 
total budget 
expenditures, % 
3,29 3,26 3,11 2,85 2,74 2,45 2,53 2,39 2,10 
Share of 
expenditures on 
public 
administration in 
GDP, % 
1,03 1,06 1,05 1,00 0,87 0,86 0,88 0,80 0,72 
The total number 
of civil servants 
and local 
government 
officials, person 
364263 379289 384197 379283 367308 372856 433269 380257 351835
Limit the 
number of 
employees of 
ministries and 
other central 
executive bodies 
and subordinate 
territorial bodies, 
person 
19063 19276 19296 19301 19301 19052 19052 19052 19052 
GDP growth, 
expressed in US 
dollar terms (% 
to previous year) 
+32,5 +26,1 –34,9 +16,4 +19,6 +7,7 +4,3 –28,1 –31,3 
The growth of 
nominal GDP, % +32,5 +31,5 –3,7 +18,5 +21,6 +7,0 +3,3 +7,7 +26,3 
The growth of 
spending on 
administration, 
% 
… +35,36 –5,13 +12,72 +5,98 +5,82 +5,89 –2,20 +13,89 
Source: calculated by authors, based on data of State Treasury Service and State Statistic Service of Ukraine 
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Table 3. The Number of People Employed in Public Administration in Ukraine and their Performance in Productivity 
2007-2015  
Indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
The total number of 
civil servants and local 
government officials, 
persons 
364263 379289 384197 379283 367308 372856 433269 380257 351835
Officials of the local 
government, persons 98948 100582 100789 99783 99204 98117 97999 84548 83465 
Civil servants, persons 265315 278707 283408 279500 268104 274739 335270 295709 268370
The share of local 
government officials 27,16 26,52 26,23 26,31 27,01 26,31 22,62 22,23 23,72 
The share of civil 
servants 72,84 73,48 73,77 73,69 72,99 73,69 77,38 77,77 76,28 
The average 
expenditure per public 
servant, thousand UAH 
20,43216 26,56151 24,87768 28,40478 31,08598 32,40669 29,5308 32,90909 40,50933
Average expenditure 
per civil servant staff of 
ministries and other 
central executive bodies 
and subordinate 
territorial bodies, 
thousand UAH 
390,43 522,64 495,33 558,18 591,58 634,21 671,57 656,83 748,09 
Marginal costs per a 
civil servant … 1,30 0,94 1,14 1,09 1,04 0,91 1,11 1,23 
Marginal costs per a 
civil servant staff of 
ministries and other 
central executive bodies 
and subordinate 
territorial bodies 
… 1,34 0,95 1,13 1,06 1,07 1,06 0,98 1,14 
GDP growth, expressed 
in US dollar terms per 
capita (% previous 
year) 
33,2 26,8 -34,6 16,8 20,1 8,0 4,5 -25,2 -29,8 
Marginal GDP … 1,03 0,98 0,95 0,87 0,99 1,03 0,91 0,90
Source: calculated by authors, based on data of State Treasury Service, State Statistic Service of Ukraine and National 
Agency for State Service  
5. Discussion 
However, for economies such as the Ukrainian, the use of standard indicators is not always indicative because 
quantitative changes in welfare occur with a certain time lag. In this case, additional information can be given by 
alternative indicators that characterize the country's position in international rankings. It should be noted that the 
significance of such indicators is essential, because the basis of their calculations is not only static information about the 
countries surveyed, which is not always reliable, but estimates can be formed also using unofficial data. 
One of the most informative rankings is the Index of Economic Freedom, which is calculated by the Heritage 
Foundation. The Index of Economic Freedom focuses on four key aspects of economic environment, which depend on 
government bureaucracy, namely the rule of law, the size of government, regulatory efficiency, and open markets. The 
indicator may range from 0 to 100, and depending on the number of points a country can be qualified as free, mostly 
free, moderately free, mostly unfree, or repressed. 
During the studied period, the economic freedom index fell from 51.5 in 2007 (Ukraine then belonged to the category of 
mostly unfree countries) to 45.8 in 2012, when Ukraine fell into the category of repressed. From 2009 to 2015, Ukraine 
was in the category of repressed (Table. 4). It should be noted that in 2014 Ukraine's index increased significantly 
compared to 2013, but in 2015 Ukraine lost its position again, indicating the low efficiency of government bureaucracy. 
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Table 4. Ukraine's Position in the Ranking of Economic Freedom in 2007-2015 
Indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Index of economic freedom 51.5 51 48.8 46.4 45.8 46.1 46.3 49.3 46.9
Fiscal freedom 90,2 83,6 79 77 77,9 77,3 78,2 79 78,7
Government spending 53.2 43 39 41 32.9 29.4 28 37.5 28
Freedom from corruption 26 28 27 25 22 24 23 21,9 25
Financial freedom 50 50 50 30 30 30 30 30 30
Property rights 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 20
Source: Heritage Foundation 
In general, economic freedom is a fundamental right of every person to manage her/his own labor and property. In an 
economically free society, individuals are free to choose work, the production of goods, and investment costs any way 
that they want. These freedoms are supported and protected by the government. Based on the data presented in Table 4, 
economic freedom in Ukraine is practically nonexistent. This is due to the formation and development of modern 
Ukrainian bureaucracy and its fusion with large business interests. Specific to Ukrainian bureaucracy development is 
that in the early 1990's new political elite started to cooperate with big businesses. Clans began to form around 
influential leaders that controlled, and continue to control, administrative areas which are supported by the relevant 
financial and industrial groups. L. Solonko describes the result as a device of quasi-corporate groups who adapted the 
new regime and its formal institutions to their own business interests (Solonko, 2001).  
In fact, a privatization of power has taken place, and bureaucracy, rather than enforces responding to the needs of the 
public, became a guardian of the interests of the ruling clans. Therefore, economic freedom in Ukraine has become a 
privilege for a narrow circle of Ukrainians. At the beginning of large-scale privatization, and especially in 1998, 
government bureaucracy began actively to make the transition to an elitist model of privatization, in which top officials 
transferred shares of state enterprises into the hands of individual businessmen, friends of the powerful, or their relatives, 
with the condition that they then follow the directions of the class of financial oligarchs. They financed election 
campaigns of government parties and individual candidates, they own the national TV channels, which then dispense 
filtered information according to the whims of their owners, and share profits with top government officials (Lanovoy, 
2015). It is this situation that developed into one of the major failures of Ukrainian bureaucracy: bias and service to 
political leaders and big business owners. As a result, Ukraine is in the category of repressed states. 
This negative assessment of the oligarch’s role in Ukrainian politics and government bureaucracy does not mean that 
the oligarchs are socially unacceptable people. On the contrary, many of them are highly educated, but they are 
essentially hostages to their love of money and power, and as a result take actions that are self-serving and not 
beneficial for the nation. A peculiarity of the Ukrainian oligarch capital structure is its low efficiency, because it is not 
the result of hard ethical labor or business management, but of a property redistribution previously rendered. Oligarch 
capital does not generate capital gains, but increases due to semi-legal redistributions of financial flows through the 
banking system and access of the oligarchs to further government funds. 
All oligarchs are basically the same, regardless of which party they support and what slogans they spout, which noble 
image to masquerade in. All of them are primarily interested in increasing their personal wealth and use the same 
method to do so: obtain access to power, use officials to lobby for financial preferences, acquire additional assets. There 
are no good or bad oligarchs, all of them being in government posts are essentially businessmen of the “wheeler-dealer” 
ilk and they continue to think of their wealth, not of the country. They know that they are in public office temporarily, 
do not plan to build a career there, and so are generally uninterested in effective work for the society they were elected 
or appointed to serve. 
It should be noted that no matter the size of the bureaucracy and the amount of funds allocated for its maintenance, in 
terms of guarantees of property rights, according to the Index of Economic Freedom, during any period Ukraine did not 
have more than 30 points, and in 2015 it was even 20. According to the methodology of the Heritage Foundation, this 
means that property rights in Ukraine have little protection, the judicial system is inefficient and highly dependent on 
other branches of government, corruption is the norm, and there is a high risk of expropriation of property. This is then 
a situation where taxpayers' money is being sent to maintain a government bureaucracy which operates in reality to 
repress them and steal from them. A similar situation exists with the rate of freedom from corruption, when, during the 
studied period, it basically remained static, but correlated with the marginal costs of bureaucracy (Fig. 2). 
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Figure 2. Correlation between Index of freedom from corruption and bureaucracy marginal costs in Ukraine 
Source: created by authors 
The coefficients in the equation in Fig. 2 show that if marginal costs of bureaucracy increase by 1, the freedom from 
corruption index decreases by 3 (negative trend). The corrupt officials in the government bureaucracy are oligarch’s 
partners, they do not just support each other, they also feed from each other’s power. If oligarchs were separated from 
government bureaucracy, the local officials would not have such high incomes, as reflected in the electronic declaration 
of income. Similarly, with an absence of loyal corrupt officials, oligarchs would not have access to public funds. 
Corruption in the Ukrainian government is a dangerous phenomenon, not only because of the scale, but also because of 
the closed “corrupt official – oligarch” system, a prerequisite for the instability in the country. This explained the fact 
that opposition oligarchs supported events at the Maidan Revolution of Dignity, but this never meant that they were 
going to destroy systemic corruption (Tab. 5). 
Table 5. Corruption Perception Index 
Indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Corruption 
perception 
index) 
(rank/score) 
(118/27) (134/25) (146/22) (134/24) (152/23) (130/26) (130/25) (130/26) (130/27)
Source: Corruption perception index 
According to the above corruption perception ranking, Ukraine's place in the ranking after the events of 2013 did not 
change, even more, the country has since worsened. Despite recent enactments of anti-corruption laws, tolerance to 
systemic corruption is maintained by oligarchs who now have access to power. In fact, these repressive mechanisms are 
likely a cover for the continuation of corrupt schemes, and tool for demonstrative punishment against those who object. 
As examples from history show, repression alone is not enough. China, having the death penalty, has executed 200 
officials convicted of bribery each year since 2000. Perhaps the problem is not in the degree of repressive legislation, 
but in the degree of openness of information which should be available and understandable to the average citizen. 
An important component of the Index of Economic Freedom is the financial and fiscal freedom and government 
spending index (tab. 4). Ukraine's numbers in the fiscal freedom index do not have the highest values, but nevertheless 
tend to decrease due to rising marginal tax rates for personal income and the total tax burden due to increases in 
unjustified overpayments of income tax and non-return of VAT refunds. These trends do not contribute to confidence in 
the government by taxpayers. 
The government expenditures index characterizes the efficiency of government bureaucracy. Unlike the components of 
guarantees of property rights, it has no clear quantitative restrictions and varies depending on the level of development. 
However, the low level of property rights protection and financial freedom, as is the case of Ukraine during the studied 
period, the indicator again reveals low efficiency in government bureaucracy. 
The value of the component of financial freedom at 30 points means that the government maintains extensive activities. 
Also, it shows that the government owns or controls most financial institutions, whose activities are strictly limited. 
y = 0.2732x2 - 3.0601x + 31.291
R² = 0.8033
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Moreover, most Ukrainian banks are directly or indirectly under the control of oligarchs, and associated with politicians. 
For example, “Privatbank” is owned by I. Kolomoiskiy and H. Boholubov, PUMB is owned by R. Akhmetov, “Credyt 
Dnipro” is owned by I. Pinchuck. Many banks are under the control of parliamentary deputies (former or current), for 
example, Diamantbank is owned by D. Zhvania, Tascombank is owned by S. Tihipko, “Fortuna Bank” is owned by S. 
Tyshchenko, “Klirynhovy Dim” is owned by Y. Liovochkin and I. Fursin. Even the current President of Ukraine 
indirectly owns a 60% share of the “International Investment Bank”, while his political ally, current parliamentary 
deputy, I. Kononenko, owns a 15% share of this bank. 
The absence of financial freedom is confirmed by the fact that the Ukrainian market is gradually being abandoned by 
foreign banks, leaving space for Russian banks. From 2009-2012, the retail bank market saw ING Bank, Home Credit 
Group, Сredit Europe Bank, Societe Generale, Swedbank all depart. In 2012, German Commerzbank sold Forum Bank, 
while the owners of Erste Bank and Kievan Rus did the same, and Volksbank International Group simply vacated the 
market entirely. 
In 2014-2015, most banks with foreign capital were offered for sale. The negative tendency is that banks with foreign 
capital are then replaced by oligarch-owned banks, which are concerned primarily about lending money to the 
businesses of their owners, the oligarchs. Financial pressure in the banking sector has not decreased in 2016, as 
evidenced, for example, by the withdrawal of Khreshchatyk Bank from the market, and Platinum Bank, which is barely 
surviving. 
Additionally, indicators of public administration efficiency, which are annually published by the World Bank Group, 
were analyzed2 (Table 6).  
Table 6. Indicators of Efficiency of Public Administration in Ukraine in 2007-2015, (-2.5…+2.5) 
Indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Voice and accountability 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.1 -0.13 -0.29 -0.33 -0.08 -0.03
Government effectiveness -0.67 -0.71 -0.8 -0.75 -0.81 -0.58 -0.65 -0.38 -0.51
Regulatory effectiveness -0.42 -0.52 -0.57 -0.52 -0.61 -0.61 -0.64 -0.63 -0.58
Rule of law -0.74 -0.69 -0.77 -0.81 -0.83 -0.79 -0.83 -0.79 -0.80
Control corruption -0.74 -0.79 -1.01 -0.98 -1.00 -1.03 -1.09 -1.00 -0.98
Political stability, no violence 0.15 0.03 -0.31 -0.02 -0.08 -0.1 -0.76 -1.93 -1.93
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 
The values range from "-2.5" to "+2.5". According to the data presented in Table 6, significant changes in the rankings 
for Ukraine did not occur, except the indicator of political stability and violence, which deteriorated sharply in 2014 due 
to the outbreak of conflict in the Donbass. Indicators of voting rights and accountability (in 2015 there was a recovery 
to the level of 2013) and the efficiency of government (figure improved in 2014, but fell again in 2015) have not 
changed significantly over the last two years. From all present indicators, the values of the rule of law and control of 
corruption are the most troubling.  Over the entire study period, they remained static and confirm again the low 
efficiency of law in Ukraine and the lack of tangible results in fighting corruption. For example, close to the Ukrainian 
rate of control of corruption stands Cambodia (-1.04), Cameroon (-1.03), Guinea (-0.97), Mauritania (-0.91), Nicaragua 
(-0.87), Russia (-0.86). In terms of the rule of law, those close to Ukraine's ratings are Algeria (-0.83), Belarus (-0.79), 
Lebanon (-0.79), Mali (-0.76), Pakistan (-0.79), Togo (-0.8). This demonstrates that the effectiveness of the Ukrainian 
government bureaucracy is at about the same level as those countries in Africa and Asia which were mentioned above. 
In fact, in addition to direct budget expenditures for the maintenance of government bureaucracy, Ukrainian society 
annually loses much more because of corruption (Fig. 3). 
                                                        
2Worldwide Governance Indicators.–[Electronic source].–Available at:  
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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Figure 3. Correlation between GDP growth, the equivalent in USD and index of control of corruption in Ukraine 
Source: created by authors 
A linear correlation exists among the studied parameters with a high coefficient of determination, which is reliable and 
coincidental. The equation coefficients show that an increase of 1 in the corruption control index means that Ukraine 
sees a 4.84% decrease in GDP in dollar terms. Based on the calculated elasticity, over the studied period Ukraine lost at 
least US$ 3.751 billion GDP due to corruption. These losses of GDP represent lost benefits to the citizens of Ukraine, 
lost due to the support of corruption in the government bureaucracy. 
Acknowledgements  
The following conclusions are not to be seen as an exhaustive list, but as first steps to setting Ukraine on the path of 
economic freedom. 
1. The government bureaucracy in Ukraine is grossly ineffective, and its cost to society, taking into account the loss of 
potential economic growth, is enormous. The existing bureaucratic-oligarchic union deprives the country of its future, 
does not promote the rule of law, and does not fight corruption. We often hear the opinion that corruption has become a 
Ukrainian national feature and therefore cannot be overcome. However, international experience shows New Zealand, 
Finland, and Singapore have all successfully overcome systemic corruption. It is not enough to adopt a number of laws, 
create agencies and bureaus to fight corruption. Rather, it is necessary to radically change the approach to the formation 
of government bureaucracy and control its activities. 
2. Work in government bureaucracy must be conducted by professionals who want to develop professionally in this area. 
Therefore, they must attain good results in their duties of service. They must not have connections with business or 
related entities and must not act in the interests of any political oligarchic group. It is important to establish direct 
prohibitions for businessmen to work for the government or municipal authorities. 
3. Information on management decisions by politicians and on all financial flows under the control of government 
bureaucracy must be made available to the public. The current business situation in Ukraine requires an inordinate 
amount of bureaucracy, which is used by corrupt officials to effectively control business markets and opportunities, 
forcing funds back into the hands of the oligarch masters. This cycle must be broken through sound deregulation and 
complete transparency of business/government interactions. 
4. In cases of privatization, limits must be set prohibiting the sale of shares to one holder, thereby neutralizing oligarchic 
clan influence, and preventing the further creation of oligopolies. 
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